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he original title of Alberto Trejos and
Randall Wright’s article contained the
phrase “A Step Further.” This seemed
unduly modest: Although Trejos and
Wright haven’t yet delivered a grand uni-
ﬁed theory of international money, they’ve
certainly taken more than one step. Their
divisible output model can address a wide
range of issues in interesting ways. Even
where its answers are not satisfying, they
are informative about the drawbacks of
this class of models and point future
researchers in productive directions.
WHY SEARCH MODELS?
At this stage of their development,
search theory models of money are still
pretty stilted. Things are not modeled in
the most natural way, and results some-
times come from strange places in the
model. Thus I think it is important to start
by brieﬂy outlining what search theory ad-
vocates think they are accomplishing. The
dominant general equilibrium paradigm in
economics is the Walrasian model, which
works like a giant general store with a re-
ally smart proprietor. He knows exactly
what is in inventory, what is coming in,
and what everybody wants. Then he ﬁg-
ures out what rates he can trade at (rela-
tive prices) to have zero excess demand
for everything. And the truly amazing
thing is that he works for free; the process
of trade does not consume resources.
There is not much need for any other sort
of institution. In particular there is no
need for money.
The basic idea behind search theory
models of money is that intratemporal
trade is costly. We have a pretty good idea
by now of what happens in economies
with super-sophisticated Walrasian trading
institutions. But what happens if we go to
the opposite extreme? Search theory mod-
els start with no trading institutions. Peo-
ple meet each other at random. Maybe
they can trade, maybe they cannot, de-
pending on who wants what and who has
what. If they cannot trade today, they try
again tomorrow. The social contrivance of
money, as Samuelson called it, turns out to
be very useful in this kind of environment.
This article is in the second generation
of search models, which Trejos and Wright
(1995) started in a previous paper. A sin-
gle indivisible unit of money can be traded
for a variable quantity of goods. Why not
instead allow people to trade a single unit
of goods for a variable quantity of money?
The simple answer is that it is too difﬁcult.
Nobody knows yet how to do it in a very
satisfactory way.
Divisible goods models like the one in
this article are a clever compromise be-
tween the tractable and the ideal. There is
a hidden cost to doing things this way,
however. Even though we have variable
prices, it is very difﬁcult, maybe impossi-
ble, to get this sort of model to deliver
sustained inﬂation. With people allowed to
carry around only one unit of money, you
cannot force per capita money holdings
to grow past one, which they must do if
per capita money grows at a constant rate.
Pretty soon everybody is holding money,
and no trade takes place. Thus it is not
reasonable to expect steady-state inﬂation
from this class of models.
THE INTERNATIONAL
SEARCH MODEL
So now let’s look at what we do get
here. There are two countries. Inside the
countries traders are vibrating around, oc-
casionally crashing into each other. When
people crash into one another, sometimes
trade is possible. You might have some-
body who can produce papayas running
into somebody who likes papayas. Barter
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will not be possible because preferences
are set up in a ring structure. With three
goods, producers of papayas like kiwis,
producers of kiwis like mangoes, and pro-
ducers of mangoes like papayas. However,
trade might be possible if the guy who
likes papayas has some kind of money. In
Trejos and Wright’s divisible output model
the traders play a bargaining game. In ear-
lier work, they studied several kinds of
bargaining games. Here they just give all of
the gains from trade to the buyer.
The problem that has to be solved by
the seller is this: How much will I produce
for my country’s money and how much for
foreign money? I have to think about basi-
cally two kinds of things when I make this
decision. I know I am going to meet other
foreign and domestic producers in the fu-
ture. How much will they produce in ex-
change for the different kinds of money?
How likely is it that I will run into foreign
and domestic producers?
By assumption, if I run into a guy with
domestic money, I take it as long as the
buyer does not want me to produce too
much (which he never does in equilib-
rium). These kinds of trades always take
place in this model.
If I run into someone with foreign
money, my problem is more complicated. I
need to think about how easy it is to get
rid of the foreign money. Of course this
depends on how likely it is that I will meet
foreigners. But it also depends on what I
think other domestic producers will do if
I offer them foreign money. This is crucial.
If I think that they will produce a lot for
me, I will be inclined to produce lots for
my buyer. This results in one of the equi-
libria with international money. If I think
that other domestic producers are not very
interested in foreign money, neither am I.
In this case I am willing to produce only a
little for my buyer. He is not willing to
make any offer I think is reasonable. So we
do not trade. This is the equilibrium with
no international money.
It is an important aspect of this model
that for many parameter values there are
multiple equilibria. In other words,
whether you do or do not have interna-
tional money sometimes depends only on
those expectations. For some parameters,
either, neither, or both moneys can be in-
ternational. The clearest case in which
there is a single equilibrium is when one
country is large relative to the other coun-
try. Developing models that describe the
process by which the economy settles on
one equilibrium would be an important
advance, in my opinion. Trejos and Wright
allude to one possible route when they
mention that they are not going to con-
sider monetary policies aimed at inﬂuenc-
ing which equilibrium prevails.
POLICY
I was particularly glad to see the sec-
tion on endogenous policy, where the mo-
tives of the money issuer are clearly laid
out. The authors provide one model for
idealists and three models for cynics.
There are some satisfying and intriguing
results here that the authors do not em-
phasize. I particularly like one such pair.
First, a reassuring result: Unilateral
seigniorage maximization produces lower
steady-state welfare than welfare maxi-
mization. I would be pretty worried about
the model if it produced the opposite re-
sult, just as I would be worried if steady
states with lots of money delivered more
valuable money than steady states with
only a little money.
The intriguing twin of that result is
the remarkable fact that cooperative
seigniorage maximization can dominate
noncooperative welfare maximization in
welfare terms. What is going on here is
that each government’s monetary policy
generates externalities for the other coun-
try. Both countries can be better off if
those externalities are internalized in a co-
operative arrangement, even if they are
cooperating over maximizing the wrong
objective.
I do have some reservations about the
article’s welfare results for several interre-
lated reasons. First, the optimizing govern-
ments are restricted to choosing their pol-
icy from among the class of policies that
result in constant per capita money. I doMAY/ JU N E 1 9 9 6
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not think anyone believes that a govern-
ment’s seigniorage-maximizing policy is
one that produces unchanging prices. If
we are serious about seigniorage as a mo-
tive for money issue, we will have to build
models in which inﬂation can occur.
My second reservation comes from the
two sources of money’s real effects in this
model. First, money facilitates trade. That
is what makes welfare rise at lower levels
of M. I have no problem with that. In a
way it is the whole point of search models
and a compelling story about why soci-
eties use money. But what drives welfare
down as M rises is a combination of two
things. First, producers will not be willing
to produce as much, so fewer goods are
traded in each match. Second, however,
producers are literally crowded out of the
market. Everybody is running around with
money, so not only are goods expensive,
you also have trouble ﬁnding them.
Putting one more unit of money into cir-
culation means there will be one less pro-
ducer. This is a rather strained model of
the costs of inﬂation.
My ﬁnal point on policy is this: One of
the beauties of the original Kiyotaki and
Wright models is that money crops up
more or less endogenously. Nobody is
forced to use it. In this model they are
forced to use it. There is no other way to
accomplish trades. One position on this is
that we know money is used in these envi-
ronments, so why should we go to all the
trouble of putting barter into every one of
our models? I think it matters here be-
cause the possibility of barter would put a
constraint on seigniorage maximization.
As in the original Kiyotaki and Wright
models, traders would have the option of
never trading for money. Seigniorage is
measured in real terms here, but if barter
were an option, the monetary equilibrium
could still collapse at a lower level of
money than the optimal level in the pres-
ent model. To make this work you would
need to give traders an outside option, call
it home production, which gives them a
utility ﬂoor if they chose not to attempt
trade. When money supplies are too high
then, the only equilibrium will be barter.
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